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Security Council

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Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Liberia, pursuant to the letter dated 29 November 2002 (S/2002/1305) from the President of the Security Council

I. Introduction

1. By a letter dated 29 November 2002 (S/2002/1305) from its President, the Security Council requested that I provide it with a report every three months on (a) the overall situation in Liberia; (b) the preparations, conditions and readiness for free and fair elections; and (c) the human rights situation. The present report is submitted pursuant to that request.

II. Security situation

2. As indicated during the last briefing on this subject to the Council, on 17 January 2003, the main challenge confronting Liberia remains the continuing insurgency mounted by the rebel movement Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), whose fighters have attacked Government forces and seized territory in various parts of the country. In early February 2003, following their capture of Bopolu, the main city in Gbarpolu county, LURD fighters were said to have come within 20 miles of Monrovia before Government of Liberia troops reportedly drove them back more than 50 miles. The situation nevertheless remains extremely volatile, with the rebels reportedly in firm control of several towns and cities, including Fassama and Kolahun, as well as most of the other cities in Lofa county, including Zorzor and Voinjama, the LURD headquarters.

3. The recent rebel offensive has coincided with worrisome developments on Liberia's borders with Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone. The violent conflict that has racked Côte d'Ivoire since 19 September 2002 has also involved heavy fighting between Government and rebel forces in that country's western region, bordering on Liberia. The Government of Liberia has denied allegations of its involvement in Côte d'Ivoire's crisis, arguing instead that the situation in that country results from unchecked rebel activities throughout the subregion, from which Liberia itself continues to suffer. The Government of Liberia recently moved elements of its armed forces to its eastern border with Côte d'Ivoire to prevent a spillover of the Ivorian fighting, especially following reports of an armed incursion into the Liberian border town of Gbein, which left two Liberian soldiers dead. Authorities claimed that the attack had been carried out by Liberian fighters belonging to the erstwhile

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United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia rebel movement, who had been masquerading as Ivorian Government border troops. The Government of Liberia complained to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) over the incident and is said to have taken steps with the Ivorian authorities to improve border security. The Liberian Minister of Information indicated that Liberian mercenaries might have participated in the Ivorian conflict but stressed that no Government forces had been involved.

4. Similarly, on the border with Sierra Leone, armed men continued to cross over from Liberia, some of them said to be engaging in extensive looting and harassment in villages inside Sierra Leone. In the past week, since LURD seized control of the parts of Cape Mount county bordering Sierra Leone, an influx of about 6,000 Liberian refugees has been witnessed. During the same period, no fewer than 247 soldiers of the Armed Forces of Liberia have fled into Sierra Leone. According to my Special Representative for Sierra Leone, the situation has begun to arouse great concern for the Government of Sierra Leone in terms of the possible overstretching of the internment camp constructed a few months ago for the trickle of armed elements from Liberia. Moreover, any counter-attack by Liberian Government forces is likely to provoke a greater inflow of refugees into Sierra Leone, and perhaps of LURD fighters, thus increasing the likelihood of armed elements evading the screening procedure, as some have tried to do. However, since the inception of border patrols by joint Sierra Leone and United Nations forces, reports of incursions have declined, although occasionally gunfire is reported to be heard from the Liberian side of the border. On 14 January 2003, the Consulate of Côte d'Ivoire in Monrovia addressed a note verbale to my Representative in Liberia informing him of the alleged presence, in the Ivorian town of Guiglo, of the former Revolutionary United Front commander, Sam Bockarie, who, along with some of his followers, had reportedly participated in the fighting in that region. He was also said to have looted Ivorian villages and sold the goods at the border with Liberia.

III. Political situation

5. Meanwhile, the overall political climate in the country remains tense and volatile despite the lifting of the state of emergency in November 2002. Public demonstrations without prior approval are prohibited, and the National Peace and Reconciliation Conference, which began in August and went on recess in September 2002, appears to have lost the momentum required to move the peace process forward. The fact that the reconciliation process does not involve all stakeholders, including exiled politicians, appears to have cast doubts on its credibility. Nevertheless, as the general and presidential elections of October 2003 approach, some prominent exiled opposition leaders have recently returned to Liberia and resumed their political activities.

6. Given the wide recognition that the continuing armed insurgency hampers peaceful political discourse in Liberia, initiatives to bring the Government and LURD to the negotiating table have gained great significance. To that end, following recent preparatory efforts under the auspices of the ECOWAS Parliament, a meeting was held in Freetown, from 7 to 9 February 2003, between ECOWAS parliamentarians, civil society and members of the Inter-Religious Councils of the Mano River Union countries and representatives of the LURD dissident group, in a bid to find a peaceful resolution of the conflict in Liberia. At the end of the three-

day meeting, ECOWAS parliamentarians and LURD agreed to continue the dialogue they had embarked upon and to maintain contact through the Inter-Religious Councils of the three Mano River Union countries. The ECOWAS Parliament further agreed to actively pursue a peaceful settlement of the crisis in Liberia, while LURD agreed to commit itself to the peaceful resolution of the crisis by the end of this year. LURD also agreed to engage in dialogue with the Government of Liberia at a place and time to be arranged and facilitated by the ECOWAS Parliament, the Inter-Religious Council of Liberia and other international bodies.

7. It is also felt that, given the porosity of borders and accusations by Liberia of external support for the LURD insurgency, subregional cooperation would be vital for peace inside Liberia to take hold. That is why the failure to convene a second Rabat Summit designed to review progress and chart the way forward, following the February 2002 agreement among the leaders of the three Mano River Union neighbours, was seen as a major setback to peace prospects in Liberia.

8. The difficult internal and subregional situation has severely constrained economic revitalization. With limited foreign assistance and investment and with the Government devoting more than 60 per cent of its budget to the military sector, growth has stalled, with unemployment widely reported to have exceeded 80 per cent. The Government continues to blame the rebellion, as well as what it regards as unfair, unjustified and arbitrary Security Council sanctions, for the grim state of the economy and the humanitarian suffering it engenders.

9. Meanwhile, the authorities have taken steps to regulate the mining and marketing of diamonds under the Kimberly Process, with a view to generating revenue. The Government has also attempted to infuse accountability into its timber and maritime trade by commissioning the auditing firm Deloitte & Touche to set up a management system for those sectors. This is in response to allegations of the misuse of funds from those sectors, and also in response to the demands contained in resolution 1408 (2002), paragraph 10, which calls upon the Government of Liberia to take urgent steps, including through the establishment of transparent and internationally verifiable audit regimes, to ensure that revenue derived by the Government of Liberia from the Liberia Shipping Registry and Liberian timber industry is used for legitimate social, humanitarian and development purposes, and is not used in violation of resolution 1408 (2002). The Government was to report back to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1343 (2001) on the steps taken and the results of such audits no later than three months after the adoption of resolution 1408 (2002). However, the arrangement recently suffered a setback when the auditing firm, citing unspecified political pressure overseas, backed out of the contract to provide the required audit services. In the meantime, VISCON, an affiliate company of Deloitte & Touche, has been mandated by the Liberian authorities to proceed with the implementation of the second phase of the project as a temporary measure pending the selection of a new auditing firm.

IV. Preparations, conditions and readiness for free and fair elections

10. The Government of Liberia has asserted that, regardless of the prevailing political and security environment in the country, it is determined to go ahead with preparations for, and the holding of, legislative and presidential elections scheduled

for October 2003. The Government has also promised to create a level playing field for all candidates and other stakeholders and to guarantee enabling conditions for credible and democratic polls.

11. It is widely felt, nevertheless, that a number of obstacles will have to be overcome if free and fair elections are to be held on time, including an immediate cessation of hostilities and the conclusion of a peace agreement with LURD, the reconstitution of the Elections Commission and the deployment of an international stabilization force before, during and after the electoral period to ensure public safety and security. It is also argued that the 10-year residency clause contained in article 52 of the Constitution constitutes a major impediment to holding a fair presidential election, since it would, in the view of some opposition groups, lead to the disqualification of several opposition candidates who had to flee Liberia to seek security in foreign countries. President Taylor has repeatedly warned Liberians residing abroad, especially those holding a green card for permanent residency in the United States of America, that they would not be allowed to contest the presidential election. Some opposition parties, as well as the electoral alliance composed of a number of opposition political parties, have expressed support for the Government's avowed determination to apply the residency clause to the letter.

12. On 2 January 2003, the Elections Commission released its electoral calendar, which provides for the electoral campaign to commence on 20 June and run through 13 October, with voting to take place on 14 October. The Commission is, however, to indicate whether or how registration, campaigning and voting are to take place in those areas paralysed by the war, or how the representation of the newly created counties is to be effected in the absence of a national census. The question of the Commission's own composition remains unresolved, as many opposition leaders claim that the present membership is dominated by officials loyal to the ruling National Patriotic Party.

13. Despite these shortcomings, former Senate President Charles Walker Brumskine of the Liberian Unification Party, Marcus Dahn of the United People's Party and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf of the Unity Party (UP) recently returned to Liberia to prepare for the presidential contest.

V. Human rights situation

14. Concerns over Liberia's human rights situation continue to relate principally to the activities of the Anti-Terrorist Unit and the National Police, who are accused time and again of harassing the civilian population in the pursuit of alleged accomplices of LURD rebels. Consequently, arbitrary arrests and detentions have occurred, although those detained are usually released because the charges levelled against them are unsubstantiated, and also as a result of pressure from human rights and other civil society groups. Currently, two prominent human rights activists remain in jail, charged with treason. Last December, however, Hassan Bility, a journalist arrested in June 2002 for allegedly conspiring to assassinate President Charles Taylor, was released and exiled to the United States of America. Furthermore, two senior officials of the Inter-Religious Council of Liberia, the civil society organization that has actively sought to broker peace between the Government and LURD, were recently arrested and charged with treason. Although

they were subsequently released, the incident heightened anxiety throughout the country.

15. The independent expert appointed by the United Nations Human Rights Commission under its confidential 1503 procedure visited Liberia from 16 to 21 December 2002. She expressed concern over human rights abuses on the part of security agencies in the context of what she saw as a pervasive culture of impunity. She also criticized the use of child soldiers by both sides in the Liberian conflict and stressed the need to strengthen the dissemination of human rights education among both the civilian population and the security agencies.

VI. Humanitarian situation

16. Liberia's internal conflict has created a massive displacement of civilians, with an estimated 180,000 internally displaced persons currently encamped and tens of thousands of others squatting in host communities. The ongoing civil conflict in nearby Côte d'Ivoire has generated additional humanitarian strains on Liberia, as thousands of Liberian refugees living in Côte d'Ivoire have been forced back to Liberia, along with thousands of Ivorians fleeing the fighting in their country. In addition, Liberia continues to host some 17,000 Sierra Leonean refugees, living in camps around Monrovia.

17. The first reaction of the Liberian Government to the huge influx of returnees and refugees from Côte d'Ivoire was to close its common border with Côte d'Ivoire, reportedly to prevent Liberian rebels from crossing into Côte d'Ivoire to support the Ivorian insurgents who had captured the western part of their country. The Government's action created difficulties for the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in assisting the refugees and returnees crossing the border in search of relative safety in Liberia. By December 2002, after the Government had reopened the border for humanitarian purposes, it was estimated that some 69,000 people, most of them Liberian returnees, had crossed into Liberia.

18. Only about half of Liberia's minimum humanitarian needs have been met, due especially to an inadequate response to the numerous appeals for assistance, as well as to the lingering problem of access for humanitarian workers to internally displaced persons who have been cut off by the fighting in various parts of the country.

VII. Observations

19. With elections approaching, Liberia finds itself at a critical crossroads. It could either turn a new page towards sustainable peace and progress under enhanced democratic governance or continue to fester in conflict and poverty, with deleterious effects for its people and the subregion.

20. The first step is to end the fighting. Dialogue remains the only means to create an enabling environment for peaceful elections and a brighter post-electoral future for the country, whose people have suffered far too long. In this regard, I commend the ongoing local and regional initiatives that have made it possible for the Government and LURD to start dialogue.

21. The still unresolved crisis in neighbouring Côte d'Ivoire has taken centre stage, fully preoccupying the regional organization, ECOWAS, and the international community. The subregional dimensions of the Liberian conflict have now clearly come to the fore with reports of the involvement of Liberian armed groups on both sides of the fighting in the Côte d'Ivoire conflict. The movement of Liberian refugees and incursions by armed groups into Sierra Leone have also been recorded recently, rendering that country vulnerable to destabilization. The presence of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone in Sierra Leone represents the major guarantee of the fragile peace and stability that now exists in the country. The conflict in Côte d'Ivoire, coupled with the fighting in Liberia, has generated hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons who now seek refuge in all of the countries of the West African region The extent of the military involvement of countries neighbouring Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire in the fighting in both countries is still not clear.

22. The conflict in Liberia is one that neither the Government nor the LURD rebel group is likely to win. However, it remains a conflict in which the LURD rebel group is determined to seize power by unconstitutional means, contrary to the decisions of the African Union, ECOWAS and the international community, not to recognize or encourage the seizure of power by undemocratic means. It is also clear that the rebel group enjoys some external military support. The international community should discourage such support, whose only achievement, so far, has been the massive displacement of innocent civilians, including women, children and the elderly, the deaths of thousands of persons and the wanton destruction of infrastructure and personal property. If decisive action is not taken to put an end to this tragedy, a generalized humanitarian and economic crisis could engulf the entire West African region.

23. I wish to draw the attention of the members of the Council to two letters dated 18 February 2003, with attachments, from President Charles Taylor addressed to the President of the Security Council. The first letter alleges that Guinea has provided military and other support to LURD. The second refers to the sanctions regime imposed upon Liberia over the past 23 months under Security Council resolutions 1343 (2001) and 1408 (2002).

24. The International Contact Group on Liberia, which is scheduled to meet at United Nations Headquarters on 28 February 2003, provides the best forum for the international community to constructively engage Liberia and to find, at the earliest possible moment, a comprehensive solution to the country's crisis, in addition to addressing the strained relations among the countries of the Mano River Union. The Contact Group should also be capable of assisting Liberia to create the proper conditions for the conduct of free and fair elections, at the appropriate moment.

25. Council members are urged to support and assist the Contact Group in its efforts to restore peace to Liberia. Council members with any influence on Liberia and its immediate neighbours are also urged to prevail on the three countries of the Mano River Union to seek a peaceful resolution of the crisis in that country through dialogue.

26. Within the limitations imposed upon it by its current mandate, and given the prevailing situation, the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Liberia (UNOL) will continue to support the Contact Group and other actors in the search for peace. In this connection, I am pleased to report that progress has been made in

the dialogue between the United Nations and the Government of Liberia on a revised mandate for UNOL.

27. Finally, in its bid to remain engaged with Liberia and its people, and given its avowed conviction that peace in that country would put an end to the suffering of the Liberian people and lead to a basis for lasting peace in the region, the Security Council may decide to go ahead with its planned mission to Liberia and its neighbours in the West African region, including to Côte d'Ivoire, as soon as possible. This would enable the Council to assess the situation at first hand in order to determine how best to collaborate with ECOWAS and the International Contact Group on Liberia in providing the needed assistance for the resolution of the various crises that now threaten the entire West African region.

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Identical letters dated 25 February 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the daily report on the activities carried out by the inspection teams of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq on 24 February 2003 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Aldouri**
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the identical letters dated 25 February 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

Activities of the UNMOVIC and IAEA inspection teams in Iraq

Inspection activities on 24 February 2003

I. IAEA inspection team

Group I

A group of two inspectors left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 8.40 a.m. and travelled to the following sites and companies, all of which belong to the Military Industrialization Corporation (MIC): the Karamah State Company, the Fath State Company, the Razi State Company and the Yarmuk State Company. The purpose of the inspections was to investigate the use being made of Anco magnets at these companies and to interview the managers of the companies about the sites at which the magnets were in use, the entity that supplied them and the plans that had been made for them. The mission lasted three hours, after which the group returned to the hotel.

Group II

A group of three inspectors left the Canal Hotel at 8.30 a.m. and travelled to the Milad State Company, which belongs to MIC and is located 25 kilometres south of Baghdad. The purpose of the inspection was to inquire about magnets and to ascertain how many of them had been delivered, where they were being used, their specifications and whether there were any initial plans for them. After completing this assignment, the inspectors travelled to another site, the Radar Research Centre, which is part of the Milad company, where they carried out a further inspection. The mission lasted two hours, after which the group returned to the hotel.

Group III

A group of three inspectors left the Canal Hotel at 8.40 a.m. and travelled to various areas in Baghdad, where they carried out radiation surveys using portable equipment designed to detect any traces of radioactivity. The mission lasted three hours, after which the group returned to the hotel.

II. UNMOVIC inspection team (biological)

Group I

A group of 10 inspectors left the Canal Hotel at 8.40 a.m. and travelled to a site in the Aziziyah area that is used for the destruction of shells. Upon arrival, the inspectors requested the director's permission to visit the excavation site, where they asked questions about the shells that had been dug up at the site, the number of sites containing buried shells, the composition of the shells before they were buried, and the chemicals used in their destruction. The group then inspected the entire site

and all excavation areas. The mission lasted four hours, after which the group returned to the hotel.

Group II (Mosul)

A group of eight inspectors left the Nineveh Palace Hotel and travelled to the Engineering School of Mosul University. Upon arrival, the inspectors held discussions with the School's Administrators and asked questions about when the environmental laboratory had been set up, the activities and experiments conducted in the laboratory, the type of biological and chemical analyses carried out on drinking water and waste water, whether there was any cooperation with other entities, the number of staff members and the means of funding. The group then inspected all of the School's premises. The mission lasted one hour, after which the group returned to the Nineveh Palace Hotel.

III. UNMOVIC inspection team (chemical)

A group of seven inspectors left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 9 a.m. and travelled to the Technology Institute, which comes under the Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research. Upon arrival, the inspectors asked the Dean of the Institute a number of questions about the Institute's various departments, the number of faculty members and students, the type of research conducted there, the links between the Institute and other entities, and its relations with the military establishment. After inspecting the entire Institute, the inspectors travelled to another site, the Faculty of Technology, which comes under the Department of Technical Education, where they met with the Dean and asked questions about the length of the programme, the number of teachers, students and departments, and the links between the Faculty and other faculties or ministries, particularly the Ministry of Defence. The group then inspected the entire premises. The mission lasted two hours, after which the group returned to the hotel.

IV. UNMOVIC inspection team (missiles)

Group I

A group of four inspectors left the Canal Hotel at 8 a.m. and travelled to the Mu`tasim plant located 80 kilometres south of Baghdad. The plant belongs to the Rashid State Company, which is part of MIC. Upon arrival, the inspectors met with the plant managers and asked questions about the missile components and parts produced at the plant, the testing method used to conduct electrical tests on missiles, quality-control activities, and the type of propellants used. The group then inspected the plant's premises and tagged some of the equipment and missiles. The mission lasted four hours, after which the group returned to the hotel.

Group II

A group of four inspectors left the Canal Hotel at 8.30 a.m. and travelled to the Izz State Company, which is part of MIC and located seven kilometres north of Baghdad. Upon arrival, the inspectors met with the director of the company and asked questions about the type of projects carried out by the company and its missile

guidance and control activities. They also asked whether the company had any plans for future projects and whether the research work being conducted was related to development and production activities. The group then inspected the entire premises. The mission lasted four hours, after which the group returned to the hotel.

Group III

A group of three inspectors left the Canal Hotel at 9.30 a.m. and travelled to the Harith State Company, located some 50 kilometres north of Baghdad and belonging to MIC. Upon arrival, the inspectors tagged the Volga missiles located on the premises and inspected the workshop complex which specializes in missile maintenance. The mission lasted three hours, after which the group returned to the hotel.

Group IV

A group of two inspectors left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 8.30 a.m. and travelled to the Qa'Qa' State Company, which is part of MIC. Upon arrival, the group inspected the Qa'id plant belonging to the above-mentioned company and tagged and measured a 30-gallon mixer. They then travelled to another site, the Rashid State Company, also a part of MIC, where they met with its managers and asked questions about the company's declarations, which were thoroughly checked. The mission lasted three hours, after which the group returned to the hotel.

V. UNMOVIC joint inspection team in Mosul

A group of five inspectors left the Nineveh Palace Hotel at 9 a.m. and travelled to a military site where a Ministry of Defence supply and transport unit is located. On arrival, the group inspected all of the site's facilities, including shelters and fuel tanks, and then inspected all of the roads on the site in their vehicles. The mission lasted two hours, after which the group returned to the Nineveh Palace Hotel.

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Identical letters dated 25 February 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the daily report on the activities carried out by the inspection teams of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq on 25 February 2003.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Aldouri**
Permanent Representative

03-26190 (E) 110303 110303

Annex to the identical letters dated 25 February 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

Report on the activities of the UNMOVIC and IAEA inspection teams carried out in Iraq on 25 February 2003

I. IAEA inspection team

Group I

A group of four inspectors left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 9.50 a.m. and proceeded to the site of the Tahaddi State Company, affiliated with the Military Industrialization Corporation (MIC). The group met with the manager of the company and asked him about the company's operations and current major projects. The group then inspected all the company laboratories and was told about the activities carried out in each laboratory. After completing its mission, which lasted 3 hours, the group returned to the Canal Hotel.

Group II

A group of two inspectors left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 8.40 a.m. Using mobile equipment, the inspectors did a motorized radiation survey in the Za'faraniyah district. After completing their mission, which lasted 1 hour and 30 minutes, the group returned to the Canal Hotel.

II. UNMOVIC inspection team (missiles)

Group I

A group of six inspectors left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 8 a.m. and proceeded to the site of Qa'qa' State Company, belonging to MIC. The inspectors met with the manager of the company, examined the declarations concerning the company and checked them against their observations. The group then inspected a number of company warehouses and verified their contents. After completing its mission, which lasted 3 hours, the group returned to the Canal Hotel.

Group II

A group of three inspectors left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 8 a.m. and proceeded to the Rashid State Company and the Ma'mun factory, affiliated with MIC. For verification purposes, the group asked for a list of the machines manufactured by the company. It then inspected the scrap-iron yard, the insulating-materials building and the mixers building belonging to the Ma'mun factory. The group then went to the site of the Qa'qa' State Company and placed stickers on 300-gallon capacity containers. After completing its mission, which lasted 4 hours, the group returned to the Canal Hotel.

Group III

A group of four inspectors left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 8.30 a.m. and proceeded to the repair plant for the electronic base of the Ministry of Defence. The group met with the commander of the site and was told about the type of work done there and the main activities carried out in the plant's workshops. The group then inspected all the plant's warehouses and workshops. After completing its mission, which lasted 3 hours, the group returned to the Canal Hotel.

Group IV

A group of five inspectors left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 8.30 a.m. and proceeded to the Ibn al-Haytham plant belonging to the Karamah State Company, one of the MIC companies. The group met with the manager of the plant and asked him about the missile control and guidance system. It then inspected the storage area housing remote-controlled aircraft and placed stickers on Sumud missiles located at the site. After completing its mission, which lasted 3 hours and 15 minutes, the group returned to the Canal Hotel.

Group V

A group of two inspectors left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 8.30 a.m. and proceeded to the Fath factory belonging to the Fath State Company, one of the MIC companies. The group met with the managers of the factory and asked them about recent tests related to the Fath missile. The group then inspected all the buildings at the site. After completing its mission, which lasted 3 hours and 30 minutes, the group returned to the Canal Hotel.

III. UNMOVIC inspection team (biological)

Group I

A group of six inspectors left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 8.30 a.m. and proceeded to the shell destruction site at Aziziyah. The group observed the excavation work that had been done at the site to unearth the destroyed shells and account for them. After completing its mission, which lasted 3 hours, the group returned to the Canal Hotel.

Group II

A group of five inspectors in Mosul left the Nineveh Palace Hotel at 8.30 a.m. and proceeded to the College of Agriculture and Forestry of the University of Mosul. The group met with the Dean of the College and asked him questions about the main activities of the institution, its various departments, its staff, the number of students and the current research projects. The group then inspected all the college's departments and laboratories. After completing its mission, which lasted 3 hours, the group returned to the Nineveh Palace Hotel.

IV. UNMOVIC inspection team (chemical)

Group I

A group of 10 inspectors left the Canal Hotel in Baghdad at 8.50 a.m. and proceeded to the Suwayrah insecticide warehouses, which belong to the State Crop Protection Board. The group met with the manager of the warehouses and asked him about the activities conducted there and the types of services offered to customers. It then inspected all the warehouses and checked their contents. After completing its mission, which lasted 3 hours, the group returned to the Canal Hotel.

Group II

A group of 16 inspectors left Rashid airfield at 9.10 a.m. and proceeded by helicopter to the Jazirah refinery, which belongs to the Ministry of Oil. The group met with the manager of the refinery and asked him about the types of activities conducted there, the number of persons employed and the refinery's production capacity. The group then inspected all the installations of the refinery. After completing its mission, which lasted three hours, the group returned to Rashid airfield.

V. UNMOVIC joint inspection team in Baghdad

A team of 11 inspectors left the Canal Hotel at 8.30 a.m. and proceeded to the Fayha' Egg Production Company (private sector). The team met with the manager of the company and asked him about the number of fields belonging to the facility and the company's output. The team then inspected all the company's installations. After completing its mission, which lasted 1 hour and 30 minutes, the team returned to the Canal Hotel.

VI. UNMOVIC joint inspection team in Mosul

Group I

A group of four inspectors left the Nineveh Palace Hotel at 9 a.m. and proceeded to the Khalil Customs Centre Directorate, which is under the Ministry of Finance. The group met with those in charge of the centre and asked them about the major changes that had come about in the past four years and the types of goods that the centre handled. The group then inspected the installations and warehouses of the centre and examined its files. After completing its mission, which lasted 1 hour, the group returned to the Nineveh Palace Hotel.

Group II

A group of four inspectors set out at 9.20 a.m. for the Mosul ammunition depots, which belong to the Ministry of Defence. The group met with the commander of the site and asked him about the types of ammunition stored and the units served by the depots. It then inspected the depots and examined the types of ammunition stored there. After completing its mission, which lasted 3 hours, the group returned to the Nineveh Palace Hotel.

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Letter dated 25 February 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I wish to inform you that the United States of America has been escalating its aggressive and provocative actions against Iraq. During the period from 11 to 14 February 2003, a group of United States helicopters violated Iraq's airspace and international borders in the area of Makr al-Ni`am and Nukhayb west of Ar`ar. This is a flagrant encroachment on Iraq's territory and independence and is in breach of all the relevant resolutions of the Security Council.

The danger of these hostile practices lies in the context of the attempts by the United States of America to cobble together any excuse to put into practice its plans against Iraq and in the possibility that these aircraft may drop some proscribed substance, or scatter it somewhere inside Iraqi territory, in order to fabricate pretexts to attack it by alleging that Iraq has buried proscribed substances and is in material breach of Security Council resolutions.

In bringing this matter to your attention, we recall at the same time the many earlier falsifications thought up since 1990 by the United States Administration to justify its aggression against Iraq, beginning with the fabricated story of the baby incubators in a Kuwaiti hospital and including the incident involving the contamination with the chemical agent VX of samples of the remains of destroyed Iraqi missiles. We call on you to take the necessary measures to put an end to these practices in accordance with your responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Aldouri**
Permanent Representative

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Report of the Secretary-General on the situation in Somalia

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to the statement of the President of the Security Council of 31 October 2001 (S/PRST/2001/30), in which the Council requested me to submit a report, at least every four months, on the situation in Somalia and the efforts to promote the peace process, including updates on the scope of and contingency planning for launching a peace-building mission for Somalia. In addition, in its resolution 1425 (2002) of 22 July 2002, and by its presidential statement of 12 December 2002 (S/PRST/2002/35), the Security Council requested me to continue putting in place, in a coherent manner, preparatory activities on the ground for a comprehensive post-conflict peace-building mission in Somalia once security conditions permit. The Security Council also required me to provide updates on the technical assistance and cooperation given to enhance administrative and judicial capacities throughout Somalia for the monitoring of and giving full effect to the arms embargo, in accordance with the statement of its President on 28 March 2002 (S/PRST/2002/8) and resolution 1407 (2002) of 3 May 2002, and on the reporting by States to the Committee established pursuant to resolution 751 (1992) on measures they have taken to ensure the full and effective implementation of the arms embargo, in accordance with resolution 1407 (2002).

2. The main focus of the report, which covers the period since my last report of 25 October 2002 (S/2002/1201), is the progress made and the challenges faced in the Somali national reconciliation process at Eldoret, Kenya, under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) under Kenyan chairmanship. The report also provides information on the general political and security situation in Somalia as well as on the humanitarian and development activities of United Nations programmes and agencies, including measures taken in response to resolution 1425 (2002), and an update on the status of the Trust Fund for Peace-Building in Somalia.

II. Developments inside Somalia

3. During the period under review, many Somali leaders and their representatives continued to participate in the deliberations of the Somali National Reconciliation Conference in Eldoret (Eldoret Conference). One notable exception was "Somaliland", which refused to participate in the peace process. Within Somalia,

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however, inter- and intra-clan fighting continued to break out in a number of places despite the signing, on 27 October 2002, of a Declaration on Cessation of Hostilities and the Structures and Principles of the Somali national reconciliation process (see S/2002/1359, annex), hereafter referred to as the Eldoret Declaration.

4. In the Bermuda area of south Mogadishu, fighting between Abgal sub-clans in mid-December 2002 resulted in some 10 militiamen killed and 20 wounded. The fighting spread to the K-4 area and Medina district of the city, where an unspecified number of civilian casualties were reported. Elders from the two sides were able to establish a temporary ceasefire. Nevertheless, more than 20 people, including 6 schoolchildren were killed in an attack on a minibus on 24 December. Frequent kidnappings have also continued, and a total of 22 Somali civilians were reported to have been held for ransom during the period under review.

5. In the south-west, fighting over control of the city of Baidoa and its immediate environs between the militias of Colonel Hassan Mohamed Nur "Shatigadud", Chairman of the Rahanwein Resistance Army (RRA), and his two former deputies has continued (S/2002/1201, para. 9), with the city changing hands on a number of occasions. The city is currently controlled by militias opposed to Colonel "Shatigadud".

6. Further to the west, 40 people were reported killed in intra-Marehan clan fighting in Luuq on 29 October. In Kismayo, fighting between members of the Marehan and Habr-Gedir clans on 21 January 2003 resulted in casualties on both sides as well as the death of two civilians, including a child in an internally displaced persons camp. Intervention by elders from both sides helped to stop the fighting.

7. In the north-east, forces loyal to Colonel Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed of "Puntland" were reported to have attacked Jeded and Qarar-soor villages in Qardho district on 30 December 2002, to disperse rival militiamen loyal to Jama Ali Jama. In a meeting with my Representative in Eldoret, Mr. Jama claimed that Colonel Yusuf and General Mohamed Said Hersi "Morgan" had obtained arms from Ethiopia to launch the attack on his militia. He also accused Colonel Yusuf's forces of killing the District Commissioner of Qardho on 26 December.

8. In "Somaliland", security conditions have remained generally calm, and local and municipal elections took place in December 2002 (see para. 9 below). However, there was concern about possible hostilities with "Puntland" when the leader of "Somaliland", Dahir Riyale Kahin, dispatched an advance team that included troops and "technicals" to Las Anod in the Sool region, which is claimed by both "Somaliland" and "Puntland", to prepare his visit. The team had been preceded by one of the elders and "ministers" who sought to win support for "Somaliland" in the region. The arrival of Mr. Kahin in Las Anod on 7 December resulted in fighting between troops from "Somaliland" and local militia that were reinforced by troops from "Puntland". The casualties were never confirmed, but the deaths included the claimant to the post of Governor of Sool, affiliated to "Puntland", as well as one of the bodyguards of Mr. Kahin.

9. Local and municipal elections in "Somaliland" other than the Sool region took place on 15 December without incident. On 30 December, the Chairmen of the Kulmiye and UCID political parties in "Somaliland" urged the "Somaliland" administration to postpone the "Presidential Election" that had been scheduled for

23 January 2002 to allow the two parties adequate time to put forth candidates that would challenge Mr. Kahin and his running mate who belong to the UDUB party. Reports indicate that the "Presidential Election" is now scheduled for 15 April to be followed by "Parliamentary elections" in late May 2003.

Security

10. The security situation in several parts of Somalia, in particular in the south and in and around Mogadishu and Baidoa, is posing serious difficulties for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In spite of the signing of the Eldoret Declaration and the December agreements (see paras. 23-26 below), the seaport and airport in Mogadishu remain closed. The level of banditry and extortion remains high and the kidnapping of Somalis working for the United Nations and other international aid organizations remains a serious concern. On 27 October, a national officer of the United Nations Food Security Assessment Unit, Ali Ahmed Farah, was shot and injured outside Beletwein, reportedly by bandits, and on 17 December, a bomb went off at the office of the Adventist Development Relief Agency in Beletwein. Following a security assessment, all United Nations operations in the area were suspended until 14 January 2003.

11. On 30 December, a Swiss national, Martin Jutzi, was murdered in a shooting incident in Hargeisa, "Somaliland". He was employed by a Swiss organization that was reportedly planning to operate a poultry farm in "Somaliland". The culprits are yet to be apprehended in spite of the efforts of the "Somaliland" administration in collaboration with the international community.

The humanitarian situation

12. As a result of the continued fighting within Somalia, the provision of humanitarian and rehabilitation assistance to a significant proportion of the population — which is already facing destitution and malnutrition and lack of access to, or absence of, even the most basic social services — has been repeatedly disrupted.

13. In addition to instability and insecurity in Mogadishu, Baidoa, once a stable humanitarian base, remains closed to United Nations international staff due to the recent fighting. Although United Nations national staff and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with some monitoring capability have continued to operate in the area, it has been difficult to carry out needs assessments and ascertain the level of displacement of the civilian population in the area. Some of the most vulnerable communities are resident around Kismayo and the Mudug region, where the humanitarian presence remains minimal and humanitarian needs are largely unassessed, and Mogadishu, where the protection of civilians continues to be a serious concern. United Nations agencies, several international NGOs and the International Committee of the Red Cross are exploring the possibility of resuming their activities in Kismayo, in particular.

14. A joint mission of the Internal Displacement Unit of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Brookings Institution to Kismayo and Hargeisa in January 2003 informed the United Nations Country Team that internally displaced persons continued to live in congested and unsanitary conditions, lacked access to basic services and were subject to rape and other human rights violations from armed elements in and around the camps. The Country Team

is reassessing means of addressing the hu- nitarian and protection needs of internally displaced persons throughout Soma. a, including through settling them in safer locations.

15. In view of the situation, the United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator has launched a two-pronged strategy for addressing the issue of humanitarian access. Firstly, by directly engaging with clan and faction leaders in Eldoret and, secondly, by approaching representatives of the leaders as well as civil society, business and religious leadership in the field. To this end, the Humanitarian Coordinator and representatives of the Country Team plan to undertake several missions focusing on access issues in the first quarter of 2003. As access becomes more assured, a coordinated response to the needs and rights of vulnerable communities, including internally displaced persons, most of whom are living in and around urban areas, will be established.

16. The United Nations, the European Commission and international NGOs also worked closely to avert a potential problem with middle Shabelle authorities, who in late December demanded that the United Nations pay landing fees for the use of the Jowhar airstrip. Their demands (subsequently withdrawn) threatened humanitarian access not only in Jowhar (which serves as the main base of operations for the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), as well as two international NGOs) but also for operations throughout the country. As a result of this experience, policy guidelines to clarify minimum standards and charges for air operations throughout the country are under joint review by United Nations and European Commission providers of air service inside Somalia.

17. Somalia benefited from relatively good rainfall at the end of 2002, allowing for the regeneration of pastures and potentially improved crop production in some areas, in particular in the southern and central regions of Hiran, Bakol, Gedo and the Shabelle and Juba Valleys. However, insecurity and displacement in some areas of northern Gedo and in parts of the lower and middle Juba Valley have prevented some farmers from planting crops.

18. While Somalia has so far escaped the acute drought in the region, the north-western part of the country has been experiencing an influx of households and livestock migrating since January 2003 from the eastern Shinile zone and Aysha Woreda region of Ethiopia in search of pasture and water. United Nations reports indicate that more than 6,000 head of livestock have migrated into the Awdal region in "Somaliland", well above the norm for this time of year. This influx has the potential of quickly exhausting available pastures and "spreading" the drought into Somalia, which could place additional pressures on food security in the north-western part of the country.

19. Furthermore, due to low rainfall in the highlands of Ethiopia, water levels of the two main rivers, Juba and Shabelle, are reported below normal, affecting the upcoming planting season in the breadbasket regions of southern Somalia, with increased costs of irrigation and reduced crop yields and incomes.

20. Several confirmed cases of cholera marked the onset of the cholera season in mid-December. However, preparedness measures have been accelerated, such as training of health-care workers, community awareness campaigns and chlorination of wells. There was an increase in reported cholera cases in 2002 as compared to 2001, attributed to improved surveillance and different rain patterns. However, the

decreasing case fatality rate, now approaching 5 per cent is an indication of improving quality of care through training and supervision.

21. The 2003 Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Somalia was launched in November 2002. United Nations agencies and three international NGOs appealed for $77.8 million to address emergency humanitarian needs, while at the same time supporting community-based peace initiatives. As of early February, Canada, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland and the European Community have contributed to the 2003 Appeal.

III. The Somali national reconciliation process

22. As previously reported (S/2002/1201), the Somali national reconciliation process began with the convening of the Eldoret Conference under IGAD auspices on 15 October 2002. In addition to some 350 invited Somali leaders, political figures and civil society representatives, almost double that number have been present at the Conference venue.

23. The first phase of the process concluded on 27 October with the signing of the Eldoret Declaration by 22 Somali leaders, including one on behalf of civil society. It was witnessed by the representatives of the international community.

24. The Somali parties, inter alia, undertook to create federal governance structures in Somalia, and endorsed the principle of decentralization; cease hostilities; guarantee the security of all humanitarian and development personnel and installations; implement the outcomes of the national reconciliation process and the United Nations arms embargo for Somalia; combat terrorism and cooperate in the implementation of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001); and invite IGAD, the African Union and the international community to support and monitor the implementation of the agreements reached.

25. On 4 November, President Daniel arap Moi transmitted to me a copy of the Eldoret Declaration, and called for the support of the international community and the United Nations in its implementation. The African Union and the Presidency of the European Union (see S/2002/1127, annex) welcomed the signing of the Declaration and expressed support for the efforts of IGAD and Kenya. Ethiopia also issued a statement welcoming the Declaration and pledged its cooperation to ensure further progress in the process.

26. In another positive development, on 2 December, five Mogadishu faction leaders* and the Transitional National Government signed an agreement in which they pledged to ensure peace and security in Mogadishu. Furthermore, on 4 December, the five faction leaders signed another agreement that included a commitment to make efforts to reopen the international seaport and airport in Mogadishu. My Representative welcomed the agreements as an important step but stressed the need for their implementation. He stated that the reopening of the seaport and airport in Mogadishu, if realized, would be a major yardstick to measure the commitment of the leaders to secure peace and normalcy in Mogadishu.

* Mohamed Qanyare Afrah; Musse Sudi "Yallahow"; Hussein Mohamed Aidid; Osman Hassan Ali "Atto"; and Omar Mahmud Mohamed "Finish".

27. The second phase of the Somali national reconciliation process has experienced serious difficulties due to controversy regarding the number of participants in both the plenary meeting of the Conference and in the six reconciliation committees that would deliberate and report on specific aspects of the process (para. 28). The Somali leaders and representatives were unable to reach agreement on a formula of representation that would limit the number of participants to about 350 as proposed by the IGAD Technical Committee overseeing the process. Such a reduction became an imperative in view of administrative problems and the shortage of funds for the Conference. The Kenyan Special Envoy and Chairman of the IGAD Technical Committee, Elijah Mwangale, finally resorted to a formula which accorded an equal number of seats (84 each) to the four main clans of Somalia and half that number to the minority clans as a group.

28. On 29 November, Mr. Mwangale launched the second phase of the reconciliation process and circulated a list of the membership of the six reconciliation committees which would report to the Leaders Committee and the plenary meeting of the Conference on: Federalism and a Provisional Federal Charter; Demobilization, Disarmament, and Reintegration; Land and Property Rights; Economic Institution Building and Resource Mobilization; Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation; and Regional and International Relations. However, controversy among Somali leaders over membership of the Committees delayed their work for several weeks.

29. Faced with criticism from Somali leaders, Mr. Mwangale asked the Leaders Committee to take charge of the Conference and come up with ideas on the way forward. On 15 December, the Leaders Committee resolved to maintain 300 as the number of delegates for phase II of the Conference, on the basis of the 4.5 clan formula (see para. 27 above). The same formula would, they said, be applied to a transitional parliament of 450 to be set up after final agreement was reached. The Leaders Committee rejected the subsequent attempt by Mr. Mwangale and some observers to add another 100 delegates as representatives of civil society. The Leaders Committee insisted that civil society representation be limited to 16 delegates, as each of the clan delegations included civil society representatives. The issue remains unresolved.

30. Following the inauguration of the new Government of Kenya on 30 December, President Mwai Kibaki reiterated support for the IGAD-led Somali national reconciliation process. The new Government announced the appointment of Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat as the new Special Envoy of Kenya on 18 January 2003. Somali leaders, neighbouring countries and donors have welcomed Mr. Kiplagat's appointment.

31. The Foreign Ministers of the Frontline States (Djibouti, Ethiopia and Kenya) held consultations on the reconciliation process in Addis Ababa on 2 February 2003. They expressed concern about the violations of the Eldoret Declaration and decided to establish a committee, with immediate effect, that would be responsible for monitoring implementation of the Eldoret Declaration and taking appropriate action. They agreed to establish a mechanism to monitor ceasefire violations, which would consist of representatives of the IGAD Technical Committee and international partners. They welcomed the planned relocation of the Conference venue from Eldoret to Mbagathi, on the outskirts of Nairobi, as a cost-saving measure. The

Ministers agreed to meet once a month to discuss the process and the first meeting is scheduled for 1 March.

32. On 26 January, the Leaders Committee called for the representation of "Somaliland" at the Somali national reconciliation process, a call that was promptly rejected by "Somaliland". The Ministers decided to defer discussion on this issue to a later meeting.

IV. Activities in support of peace and reconciliation in Somalia

33. My Representative and staff of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia have maintained a permanent presence at the Conference and provided assistance as required by the IGAD Technical Committee, the Somali parties and civil society groups. My Representative also participated in the meeting of the IGAD Foreign Ministers of the Frontline States on Somalia in Addis Ababa on 2 February (para. 31).

34. The World Bank, in collaboration with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), funded experts to support the Economic Institution Building and Resource Mobilization Reconciliation Committee of the Somali national reconciliation process, and the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) conducted a workshop for Somali women representatives at the Eldoret Conference.

35. The Panel of Experts, established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1425 (2002) to generate independent information on violations of the arms embargo as a step towards giving effect to and strengthening the embargo, is expected to submit its report by March 2003, in accordance with paragraph 11 of the resolution.

36. The following contributions have been received for the Trust Fund for Peace-Building in Somalia during the period under review: Ireland, $34,668.65; Italy, $536,150.00; and Norway, $836,533.39.

37. Of immediate concern is the appalling situation of many vulnerable communities in Somalia, internally displaced persons, rural and urban poor, and minority clans. In addition to poor access to basic services, human rights violations, including sexual violence against women, are commonplace, especially among vulnerable groups living in southern Somali cities. Improving access to basic services and enhanced protection are immediate priorities for these people, many of whom have been disenfranchised for over a decade.

38. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) forecasts an end to the return of Somali refugees from Ethiopia and Djibouti by 2004. The return in 2002 of over 32,000 Somali refugees, mostly to "Somaliland", allowed them to participate in peace-building and reconstruction efforts and to exercise their right to vote in the municipal elections held in December 2002. Progress has also been made with regard to the provision of basic services to returnees, internally displaced persons and host communities. UNDP provided basic social services through the Returning Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons programme, which is part of a subregional initiative of IGAD in cooperation with UNHCR and UNDP for the reintegration of uprooted populations in the Horn of Africa. Eighteen quick impact projects were implemented by UNDP to address urgent water, sanitation, health, education and shelter needs. Similarly, over 100

reintegration quick impact projects were implemented by UNHCR during 2002 in "Somaliland", "Puntland" and Mogadishu and its environs. UNHCR also provided emergency support to the water supply system for the town of Hargeisa and surrounding settlements of returning refugees and internally displaced persons. Although these interventions have helped communities to absorb returning refugees with reduced competition over scarce resources and thus contributed to peace and stability, the gap between needs and available services and income-generation opportunities remains wide and continues to be a concern.

39. UNDP made progress in enhancing projects in the areas of rule of law, demobilization, disarmament and reintegration, and small arms control. In "Somaliland" and "Puntland", the UNDP new Rule of Law and Security Programme, formerly known as the Somalia Civil Protection Programme, initiated demobilization, disarmament and reintegration interventions. The Puntland Development Research Centre conducted workshops focusing on the special legal context in Somalia. Through the Academy for Peace and Development, 44 police officers were given human rights training. Six hundred sets of uniform and communication equipment were supplied to police officers and police stations in "Somaliland". A vital component of the programme is the inclusion of trained female police and custodial officers. Female training barracks were constructed in the Mandera Police Training Centre to accommodate 40 female police students. A registration programme of police weapons is also being conducted in an effort to control the proliferation of small arms.

40. UNIFEM carried out a training series on human rights, international conventions and access to justice for human rights NGOs and law enforcement agencies in "Somaliland", "Puntland", Hiran region, and Mogadishu.

41. In "Somaliland", UNDP continued to support peace-building activities through its cadastral survey project that had initially been implemented in rural areas. A new project was designed in September 2002, as a precursor to broader application in Somali urban centres. In addition, and within the context of demobilization, UNDP provided agricultural assistance to war veterans in areas that had already been mapped and surveyed by the cadastral survey project. UNDP also continued to support microcredit schemes in favour of war widows in "Somaliland".

42. The mine action component of the UNDP Rule of Law and Security Programme trained 24 Somali Mine Action Centre staff in "Somaliland". Such training included the basic demining course with supervision provided by the Danish Demining Group and data management provided by the Geneva International Centre on Humanitarian Demining. During the current reporting period, three management-level staff members of the programme attended a two-month mine action course in the United Kingdom. Similarly, two officers from the Somali Mine Action Centre were trained at a course held in Jordan.

43. In partnership with a Mogadishu-based NGO, UNICEF supported the reintegration of 120 former child soldiers into the community through a programme of vocational training, conflict resolution and trauma counselling. Engagement of the private sector and local companies in this project is an innovation that resulted in employment opportunities for the former child soldiers after completion of their training. A study was also conducted on the impact of small arms and light weapons proliferation in Somalia. Its recommendations, in particular regarding conflict resolution, peace-building and psychosocial support, will be implemented in 2003.

44. UNICEF supported local authorities and other stakeholders in the development of a child-friendly juvenile justice and law enforcement system. In consultation with Save the Children-United Kingdom, UNICEF conducted a comprehensive child protection study that will lead to targeted programmes to reach children vulnerable to the effects of conflict, violence, abuse and exploitation. At present, initiatives include select capacity-building of youth groups, the prevention of substance abuse and the provision of learning opportunities. UNICEF also assisted local education authorities in increasing the number of schools, distributed new, child-centred textbooks and curriculum, invested in teacher training, and worked with parent groups and education committees to increase enrolment.

45. The Peace Resource Centre in Erigavo negotiated and concluded a series of individual and collective agreements with 32 sultans and local chiefs in Sanaag region. The agreements bind local traditional leaders to take responsibility for the arrest and handover to civil authorities of any clan member engaged in violent or illegal activity that threatens the peace of the region or disrupts the operations of aid organizations. This agreement in effect removes the shield of clan protection under which some criminal and violent activities are carried out. Peace Resource Centres in Garowe, Beletwein, Merka and Baidoa and a network of community groups have been mobilized to play an active role in collecting and synthesizing opinions from ordinary Somalis to feed in as part of the contribution of civil society to the Somali national reconciliation process as it enters into discussions on issues of governance in its second and third phases.

46. Through its Peace Resource Centres in eight cities and towns (Erigavo, Garowe, Hargeisa, Bossasso, Beletwein, Merka, Baidoa and Mogadishu), UNESCO organized eight workshops to train members of a network of 198 community groups and local NGOs on issues of conflict resolution, human rights and gender as well as the training of 396 community group leaders as trainers. They, in turn, organized second-level workshops in their communities, in which a total of 3,956 community members were given training in the same areas. These community members are emerging as important contributors to constructive dialogue and in enhancing the role of civil society in various parts of the country.

47. UNIFEM held a series of workshops and trainings on gender and HIV/AIDS for 60 policy makers in "Somaliland" and "Puntland" as part of the development process of a national HIV/AIDS policy, while UNICEF provided training for 15 HIV/AIDS counsellors in Boroma. With the assistance of UNICEF, UNHCR has been active in HIV/AIDS-awareness activities for refugees from other countries resident in Somalia, as well as other reproductive health issues, including advocacy against harmful traditional practices. While results are still difficult to measure, the interventions went a long way in informing further such actions in the inter-agency context in 2003.

48. The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) conducted a reproductive health baseline survey in north-west Somalia, trained traditional birth attendants and rape counsellors and mobilized anti-female-genital mutilation committees in Somali refugee camps in Kenya and Ethiopia. The refugee reproductive health projects also supported voluntary counselling, HIV/AIDS testing and promotion of the use of condoms.

49. Recognizing the key role of the livestock industry in the economy of Somalia and the debilitating effect of the continued ban on Somali livestock by States of the

Arabian peninsula, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and UNDP continued to support the development of an internationally recognized certification system for the export of livestock and livestock products by strengthening the country's institutional capacity. Additional activities will be launched by FAO in early 2003 to support the livestock industry in northern Somalia. In addition, UNHCR and UNDP are collaborating in the construction of a new slaughterhouse in Hargeisa.

50. UNHCR completed the physical reconstruction of the Hargeisa Health Training Institute. Other agencies, including UNICEF and the World Health Organization, are in the process of making the facility fully functional.

V. Observations

51. The international community continues to support the Somali national reconciliation process launched under the auspices of IGAD and led by Kenya. The new Government of Kenya has spared no time in reiterating Kenya's commitment to its lead role in the regional peace effort. The appointment of the new Special Envoy of Kenya was a welcome development and is expected to help to infuse renewed vigour in the peace process.

52. In addition to the recent appointment of a Special Envoy of the African Union for Somalia, the generous financial contribution of the European Union and the sustained engagement of envoys from its member countries, as well as those of the IGAD Partners Forum and the League of Arab States underscore the commitment of the international community to a negotiated and inclusive agreement in Somalia.

53. I commend the IGAD Frontline States for the recent decision of their foreign ministers to meet at least once a month to discuss the progress made and the challenges faced in the effort to restore reconciliation and normalcy to Somalia. I also take note of their decision to set up a mechanism to monitor compliance with the Eldoret Declaration.

54. It has become increasingly clear that inside Somalia the continued outbreaks of hostilities are motivated by individual rivalries of faction leaders and criminal activities rather than wider issues. Clearly, the ordinary people and traditional leaders are war-weary and yearn for peace and a way out of years of conflict, instability and deprivation. It is those that have the weapons of war who continue to hold the people of Somalia hostage to the cycle of violence. The Somali people and the international community will no doubt hold them accountable for their actions if they persist on the path of confrontation and conflict.

55. I encourage all the Somali leaders participating in the Conference to rededicate themselves to the search for national reconciliation in their country. They must cooperate in the IGAD-led endeavour aimed at ending over a decade of conflict in Somalia and the immense suffering it has caused its people. It is essential that they agree on an inclusive political dispensation for the future of the country by putting their narrow differences aside and living up to commitments made to their fellow countrymen.

56. The first phase of the Somali national reconciliation process ended with the signing of the Eldoret Declaration on 27 October 2002, by which the participants, pledged, among other things, to cease hostilities and guarantee the security of all

humanitarian and development personnel and installations. Similarly, in another positive development, Somali leaders in Mogadishu committed themselves, in early December, to ceasing hostilities and bringing an end to killings and abductions of innocent people, as well as to solving differences through dialogue and goodwill. They also agreed to cooperate through peaceful means to reopen the Mogadishu seaport and airport and to restore public services in the city.

57. It is encouraging that the work of the six Reconciliation Committees has continued despite controversy regarding representation at the plenary meeting of the Conference. The United Nations and its agencies stand ready to assist in the work of those Committees with technical support and relevant expertise.

58. Since then, however, serious hostilities have occurred involving the militias and supporters of some of the very leaders who signed the Eldoret Declaration and the December agreements. As a result, the delivery of essential humanitarian and development assistance continues to be seriously affected, the Mogadishu seaport and airport remain closed and recent fighting in and around Baidoa has blocked off an essential port of entry for the delivery of humanitarian assistance. I urge the Somali leaders to live up to their commitments to assure the delivery of much-needed humanitarian assistance and the safety of all international and national aid workers.

59. While Somalia may not be suffering from the drought affecting its neighbours, its humanitarian assistance needs remain critical. Unlike many affected countries in Africa which are expected to return to acceptable nutrition rates after the current drought-related crises are over, chronic food insecurity resulting in unacceptably high malnutrition rates has almost become endemic to parts of Somalia. Elsewhere in the world such rates are considered a trigger for major emergency interventions but, in Somalia, they have sadly become commonplace.

60. While some parts of Somalia remain unstable, relative stability continues to prevail in significant portions of the country. In some of these areas, community-based peace-building activities have evolved with little outside support. These initiatives present windows of opportunity for the United Nations, NGOs and donors to help to maintain and build upon the peace and stability that has been achieved. Failure to do so, however, could result in renewed conflict over scarce resources as an impoverished people, including increasing numbers of returnees from exile, are struggling to survive and rebuild their lives.

61. Against this background, I welcome the contribution of Ireland, Italy and Norway to the Trust Fund for Peace-Building in Somalia and the early contributions of Canada, Denmark, Norway, Switzerland and the European Community to the 2003 Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Somalia. I call on other donors not only to contribute generously to the appeal, but also to do so without delay so as to allow the effective implementation of a full, coherent and balanced humanitarian and peace-building programme.

62. I would like to commend the efforts of my Representative for Somalia, the staff of the United Nations Political Office for Somalia, as well as the Country Team and the many NGOs active in Somalia for their humanitarian activities and their contribution to the international effort to help to promote and support national reconciliation and peace in Somalia.

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Note by the Secretary-General

The Secretary-General has the honour to transmit to the Security Council the twelfth quarterly report of the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC), which is submitted in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) of 17 December 1999 (see annex).

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Annex

Twelfth quarterly report of the Executive Chairman of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999)

Introduction

1. The present report, which is the twelfth[a] submitted in accordance with paragraph 12 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999), covers the activities of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) during the period from 1 December 2002 to 28 February 2003.

2. The period under review has been one of intense activity for the Commission. In Iraq, inspections and monitoring were resumed on 27 November 2002, requiring a rapid build-up of inspection and support staff and the resolution of operational and logistics issues. In New York the analysis of Iraq's declarations and unresolved disarmament issues went hand in hand with intense planning of inspections and administrative activities.

Briefings and consultations by the Executive Chairman

3. In the period under review, the Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC briefed the Security Council informally on 19 December 2002 and 9 January 2003 on the declaration presented by Iraq on 7 December in response to paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 1441 (2002), and on the progress of inspections in Iraq and other UNMOVIC activities. In accordance with paragraph 5 of the same resolution, he updated the Council on 27 January on the resumption of inspection activities. He also provided on 14 February, at an open session of the Council, a briefing on UNMOVIC activities.

4. The Executive Chairman and the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) visited Baghdad from 19 to 20 January and from 8 to 9 February for talks with representatives of the Government of Iraq. During these visits, they met with Vice-President Taha Yassin Ramadan. In addition, the Executive Chairman met in London with the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and in Paris with the President of France. In Athens, he met with the Foreign Minister of Greece, which currently holds the European Union Presidency. He also visited Brussels and met with senior officials of the European Commission and the European Union. In New York, he had meetings with Prime Ministers, high-level officials of Member States, as well as with Foreign Ministers, and he also briefed visiting parliamentarians and government officials.

5. The Secretary-General and his senior staff were kept informed, on a continuing basis, of the activities of the Commission.

Declaration submitted by Iraq on 7 December 2002

6. Responding to the requirement in paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 1441 (2002) to provide a "currently accurate, full and complete declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and other delivery systems", on 7 December, Iraq submitted a declaration to UNMOVIC and the IAEA and, through its President, to the Security Council. The declaration, including supporting documents, comprised more than 12,000 pages.

7. On 19 December and again on 9 January, the Executive Chairman, in his informal briefings to the Council, presented an assessment of the information contained in the declaration. UNMOVIC experts have found little new significant information in the part of the declaration relating to proscribed weapons programmes, nor much new supporting documentation or other evidence. New material, on the other hand, was provided concerning non-weapons-related activities during the period from the end of 1998 to the present, especially in the biological field and on missile development.

8. The part that covers biological weapons is, in UNMOVIC's assessment, essentially a reorganized version of a previous declaration provided by Iraq to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) in September 1997. In the chemical weapons area, the basis of the current declaration was a declaration submitted by Iraq in 1996 with subsequent updates and explanations. In the missile field, the declaration follows the same format, and has largely the same content as Iraq's 1996 missile declaration and updates.

9. However, some sections contained new information. In the chemical weapons field, Iraq further explained its account of the material balance of precursors for chemical warfare agents, although it did not settle unresolved issues on this subject.

10. In the missile area, there is a good deal of information regarding Iraq's activities in the past few years. A series of new projects have been declared that are at various stages of development.

11. As there is little new substantive information in the weapons part of Iraq's declaration, or new supporting documentation, the issues that were identified as unresolved in the Amorim report (S/1999/356) and in UNSCOM's report (S/1999/94) remain. In most cases, the issues remain unresolved because there is a lack of supporting evidence. Such supporting evidence, in the form of documentation, testimony by individuals who took part in the activities, or physical evidence, would be required.

Inspections and inspection capabilities in Iraq

12. Since the arrival of the first inspectors in Iraq on 27 November 2002, UNMOVIC has conducted more than 550 inspections covering approximately 350 sites. Of these 44 sites were new sites. All inspections were performed without notice, and access was in virtually all cases provided promptly. In no case have the inspectors seen convincing evidence that the Iraqi side knew in advance of their impending arrival.

13. The inspections have taken place throughout Iraq at industrial sites, ammunition depots, research centres, universities, presidential sites, mobile laboratories, private houses, missile production facilities, military camps and agricultural sites. At all sites, which had been inspected before 1998, re-baselining activities were performed. This included the identification of the function and contents of each building, new or old, at a site. It also included verification of previously tagged equipment, application of seals and tags, evaluation of locations for the future installation of cameras and other monitors, as well as taking samples and discussions with the site personnel regarding past and present activities. At certain sites, ground-penetrating radar was used to look for underground structures or buried equipment. Similar activities were performed at new sites. Inspections are effectively helping to bridge the gap in knowledge that arose due to the absence of inspections between December 1998 and November 2002.

14. More than 200 chemical and more than 100 biological samples have been collected at different sites. Three quarters of these have been screened using UNMOVIC's own analytical laboratory capabilities at the Baghdad Ongoing Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Centre (BOMVIC). The results to date have been consistent with Iraq's declarations.

15. UNMOVIC has identified and started the destruction of approximately 50 litres of mustard declared by Iraq that had been placed under UNSCOM supervision and seal at the Muthanna site in 1998. This process will continue. A laboratory quantity (1 litre) of thiodiglycol, a mustard precursor, which had been found at another site, has also been destroyed.

16. Towards the end of February 2003, a juncture when rotation of inspectors is taking place, the number of UNMOVIC personnel in Iraq reached a total of 202 staff from 60 countries. This includes 84 inspectors. In addition, BOMVIC has a team of United Nations translators and interpreters and a logistics and administrative staff. A unit of 10 United Nations security officers ensures the security of BOMVIC offices 24 hours a day. Medical and communication staff has been provided by the Government of New Zealand as a contribution to UNMOVIC operations. The manpower required to refurbish BOMVIC office space at the Canal Hotel was provided by the Government of Switzerland.

17. UNMOVIC air operations are carried out by 1 airplane and 8 helicopters, with a total of 57 air staff. These operations are covered by contracts with four different companies. The L-100 plane, which flies between Larnaca and Baghdad, is under a contract with a South African company. Contracts with Canadian, Russian and United Kingdom companies cover the helicopter assets.

18. With the exception of the crew of the aircraft and the helicopters and the staff provided by the Governments of New Zealand and Switzerland, all UNMOVIC employees of BOMVIC are United Nations staff recruited under the staff rules of the Organization.

19. A field office was opened in Mosul, in the north of Iraq, the first week in January, with the cooperation of Iraqi authorities. This operation base is temporarily located in a hotel with full communications capabilities. There are currently 28 staff at this location. Planning for the setting-up of prefabricated offices at Mosul airport is currently under way. There is a United Nations security team at the field office, and arrangements have been made to ensure medical assistance to the staff.

20. UNMOVIC is in the process of planning for a second field office in Basrah, in the south of Iraq, in March. The Iraqi authorities are providing cooperation to this effect.

21. During the period from 1 December 2002 to 28 February 2003, inspectors have been provided with high technology, state-of-the-art equipment. This includes some 35,000 tamper-proof tags and seals for tagging equipment, 10 enhanced chemical agent monitors (ECAMS), 10 toxic industrial materials detectors (TIMs), 10 chemical monitors (APCC), nuclear, biological and chemical protection (NBC) suits, respirators, dosimeters with reader, a complete chemical laboratory with requisite laboratory supplies and equipment, ground-penetrating radars, 3 portable gas chromatograph-mass spectrometers, 12 ultrasonic pulse echo detectors to screen the inside of warheads, equipment for sampling warheads (MONIKA), 3 alloy analysers, and biological detection and screening equipment to include PCR, ELISA, immunoassay and rapid screening technologies. Additionally, UNMOVIC has used its network of accredited laboratories to analyse a sample of missile propellant. Cameras and other surveillance systems are currently in Cyprus awaiting shipment to Baghdad.

22. The Commission's Larnaca field office has been expanded. It continues to provide essential logistics and other support.

High-level meetings in Baghdad

23. On 19 and 20 January and on 8 and 9 February, the Executive Chairman, together with the Director General of the IAEA, visited Baghdad to discuss relevant inspection and cooperation issues. He was accompanied in these missions by a number of UNMOVIC senior staff and experts.

24. The first meetings in January between the Iraqi side and UNMOVIC and the IAEA were devoted to stocktaking of the inspections which had taken place so far and to resolving certain operational issues. This included the questions of the clarification of the 7 December declaration, provision of documents, the conduct of interviews, air operations, as well as access and Iraqi assistance to the logistic build-up. A joint statement was issued upon conclusion of the talks. While it recorded a number of matters which had been solved, some remained unresolved, such as flights by U-2 surveillance planes, the conduct of interviews, the enactment of national legislation.

25. At the meeting on 8 and 9 February, the Iraqi side addressed some of the important outstanding disarmament issues. A number of papers were handed over to UNMOVIC, regarding unresolved issues in all three disarmament fields. Expert discussions were held to clarify the contents of these papers. However, they did not contain new evidence, nor did they resolve any of the open issues.

26. Other matters discussed included the possibility of verifying, through technical and analytical methods, the quantities of biological agents and chemical precursors, which had been declared unilaterally destroyed; the establishment of Iraqi Commissions to search for proscribed items and relevant documents, the necessity of private interviews, and the enactment of national legislation in accordance with the monitoring plan approved by the Security Council in resolution 715 (1991).

Interviews

27. In accordance with paragraph 5 of Security Council resolution 1441 (2002), UNMOVIC has the right to conduct, at its sole discretion, interviews with Iraqi officials and other persons with or without the presence of observers from the Iraqi Government, both inside and outside of Iraq. In the review period, UNMOVIC requested 28 individuals to present themselves for interviews in Baghdad (without the presence of observers). At first, none of them agreed. At the meeting on 19-20 January, the Iraqi side committed itself to "encourage" persons to accept interviews "in private". Immediately prior to the next round of discussions, Iraq informed UNMOVIC that three candidates, who had previously declined to be interviewed under UNMOVIC's terms, had changed their minds. UNMOVIC is currently examining the practical modalities for conducting interviews outside the territory of Iraq.

Missile programmes declared by Iraq

28. In its 7 December declaration and again in its semi-annual monitoring declaration, Iraq declared the development and production of two types of surface-to-surface missiles, which, according to the data presented, were capable of surpassing the range limit imposed on Iraq by Security Council resolution 687 (1991) and had indeed done so in a number of tests. Iraq also declared the acquisition of a large number of surface-to-air missile engines for use, after appropriate modification, in the production of these missiles. This import violates the arms embargo established by the Council in paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991).

29. UNMOVIC staff have evaluated and assessed these missile projects — the Al Samoud 2 and the Al Fatah. It has also sought the assessment of a panel of international experts on the matter. To that end, a meeting took place on 10-11 February at United Nations Headquarters with experts from China, France, Germany, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Ukraine and the United States of America. The Russian expert nominated was unable to attend.

30. As a result of these assessments, it was concluded that all variants of the Al Samoud 2 missile were inherently capable of ranges of more than 150 kilometres and were therefore proscribed weapons systems.

31. The panel found that clarification of the Al Fatah missile data supplied by Iraq was required before the capability of the missile system could be assessed. UNMOVIC will request such clarification.

32. UNMOVIC inspection teams proceeded to tag the Al Samoud 2 missiles, as well as related missile components, such as engines.

33. The experts also reviewed the capabilities of casting chambers at the Al Mamoun facility. These had previously been destroyed under UNSCOM supervision since they were intended for use in the production of the proscribed Badr-2000 missile, but had subsequently been refurbished by Iraq. The experts concluded that these reconstituted chambers could still be used to produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than 150 kilometres. Accordingly, these chambers remain proscribed.

34. On 21 February, UNMOVIC, in accordance with relevant resolutions, directed Iraq to destroy the proscribed missile system and the reconstituted casting chambers. The destruction process is to commence by 1 March.

Aerial operations

35. Subsequent to the high-level discussions on 8 and 9 February, on 10 February, the Government of Iraq formally accepted UNMOVIC's use of aerial surveillance platforms and undertook to take the necessary measures to ensure their safety.

36. The first such flight was conducted by a high-altitude U-2 surveillance aircraft on 17 February. This aircraft has conducted further flights. The missions are flown by the United States on behalf of UNMOVIC. A Mirage IV medium-altitude surveillance aircraft, flown on behalf of UNMOVIC by the Government of France, undertook its first mission on 26 February. The two aircraft can provide a number of different types of imagery and both are able to provide digital imagery to UNMOVIC in New York within a few hours of the missions taking place. UNMOVIC is currently discussing the use of a Russian AN-30 surveillance aircraft and German unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) to supplement its aerial surveillance platforms. UNMOVIC already has eight helicopters stationed in Iraq, as well as access to satellite imagery.

37. The increased capability for aerial surveillance through these new platforms provides UNMOVIC and the IAEA with additional tools to strengthen their operations and to verify Iraq's compliance with its obligations.

Other developments

38. In December, UNMOVIC asked Iraq to provide, under the fourth subparagraph of paragraph 7 of resolution 1441 (2002), the names of all personnel currently or formerly associated with some aspects of Iraq's programme of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. The Iraqi response was received at the end of December. However, it was deemed to be inadequate, as it did not even include all those who had been previously listed in Iraq's full, final and complete declaration. Iraq has since then supplemented its list of participants in the missile programme, and has declared itself to be ready to do the same in the other disciplines. This matter is still being followed up.

39. On 14 January, UNMOVIC received from the National Monitoring Directorate Iraq's semi-annual monitoring declaration for the period from July 2002 to January 2003.

40. On 16 January, UNMOVIC chemical experts inspecting the Al Ukhaidhir military stores, discovered a number of empty 122-mm chemical munitions. The munitions have been tagged pending their destruction.

41. Following this discovery, Iraq appointed a commission of inquiry to undertake an investigation and comprehensive search for similar cases at all locations. One find of four more empty 122-mm chemical munitions was reported by that commission at Al Taji munitions stores. Subsequently, UNMOVIC inspectors found two more such munitions at the same site. These six munitions will also be destroyed.

42. Later in January, Iraq expanded the mandate of the commission to search for any remaining proscribed items on Iraqi territory. A second commission was appointed with the task of searching for any documents relevant to the proscribed items and programmes. It is headed by the former Minister of Oil, General Amer Rashid, and has extensive powers of search in industry, administration and private houses.

43. On 21 and 25 February, Iraq informed UNMOVIC that two complete R-400 aerial bombs (one of which had liquid contents), plus remnants of what it states were 118 R-400 bombs, had been excavated at Azzizziyah, the declared unilateral destruction site of BW-filled aerial bombs, along with some related components and remnants of other destroyed munitions. UNMOVIC inspectors are currently investigating these finds.

44. In the course of February, the Iraqi side transmitted to UNMOVIC lists of persons involved in the unilateral destruction during the summer of 1991 in the chemical, biological and missile fields.

45. After repeated requests by UNMOVIC and the IAEA for national implementing legislation, a presidential decree was issued in Baghdad on 14 February, containing prohibitions for persons and companies in the private and mixed sectors against the production or import of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. UNMOVIC is requesting clarification of the decree and enquiring whether further legislative actions will follow.

Staffing

46. As at the end of February 2003, UNMOVIC core staff in the Professional grades at Headquarters comprised 75 persons (of 30 nationalities). Thirteen members of the staff are women.

Training

47. UNMOVIC has continued to attach high priority to the training of staff and potential staff.

48. UNMOVIC conducted its seventh basic training course in Vienna from 20 January to 7 February for 59 selected experts from 22 countries. This brings the total number of persons trained by UNMOVIC to 380, including 49 staff members from Headquarters. They comprise 55 nationalities. Further training courses are envisaged.

49. The Commission is grateful to those Member States that have supported the training activities.

Non-inspection sources of information

50. With the commencement of inspections in Iraq on 27 November, the pace of work of the Office for Outside Information increased substantially. Countries that had supplied intelligence-related information to UNMOVIC in the previous two years were again contacted in an effort to obtain new up-to-date intelligence to assist

in the inspection programme. Also, additional countries were contacted in an effort to expand the base of knowledge currently available. To date, approximately a dozen countries have provided information of potential relevance to UNMOVIC's mandate. Much of that information has been utilized in conducting inspections in Iraq.

51. The Open Sources Officer has continued efforts to research and make available to UNMOVIC information relating to Iraq's industrial infrastructure that could be used in the production of prohibited weapons. In addition, there is a large volume of public information available suggesting procurement of items by Iraq that could have a dual-use capability.

Communications

52. The inspectors were provided with the capabilities for clear and secure voice transmission from and within the mission area utilizing state-of-the-art equipment. The network is completely independent of the Iraqi public network. The telecommunications network, both voice and data, has a built-in redundancy and allows for future expansion. This redundancy is achieved by routing connections via two different satellite carriers.

53. The inspectors have INMARSAT devices and Thuraya satellite phones. Thurayas are used to establish communication from the field. The INMARSAT is being used for the field operations and also as a back-up in the regional offices. Each inspector was provided with a VHF radio and the VHF coverage extends about 80 kilometres around Baghdad. Long-range high-frequency stations were installed in the BOMVIC, the regional office in Mosul, the Office in Larnaca and the Al Rasheed air base.

Goods Review List

54. On 5 December, in resolution 1447 (2002), the Security Council renewed the "Oil-for-Food" programme for a further 180 days. The resolution also required that a review of the Goods Review List (GRL) and its procedures be completed by 3 January 2003. Discussions took place during December and the agreed changes were endorsed in resolution 1454 (2002) on 30 December. The changes dealt with additions to the GRL to include, for example, Global Positioning System (GPS) jammers and all-terrain tyres and amendments to the entries on trucks and trailers/low loaders. As a result of the amendments, UNMOVIC performed a reassessment exercise that involved the review of 200 contracts to check if they still contained items on the GRL in the light of the revised lists.

55. Resolution 1454 (2002) also revised the GRL procedures. The Office of the Iraq Programme (OIP) is required to establish consumption levels for certain specific materials by 1 March. For contracts containing items below these consumption levels, approval is vested in OIP. If the consumption level is exceeded, further exports of these goods will require approval by the sanctions Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 661 (1990). Examples of goods subject to this new procedure include atropine, selected pesticides, growth media and certain types of antibiotics.

56. The GRL procedures were also expanded for UNMOVIC and the IAEA. Both organizations are now required to keep records of certain types of materials and equipment, which could be considered for incorporation into the GRL at 90-day review points.

College of Commissioners

57. On 19 December, following the resignation, in the autumn of 2002, of Ms. Malmi Marjatta Rautio (Finland), the Secretary-General, in consultation with the members of the Security Council and the Executive Chairman, appointed Ms. Olga Pellicer (Mexico) as a member of the College of Commissioners.

58. Special sessions of the College of Commissioners were held at United Nations Headquarters on 23 January and 12 February. The Executive Chairman gave the Commissioners a report on the work of UNMOVIC since the previous sessions of the College, and on the discussions held in Baghdad on 19-20 January and on 8-9 February, respectively, as well as on recent developments with respect to the Security Council's deliberations on Iraq.

59. The College held its twelfth regular plenary session at United Nations Headquarters on 24 and 25 February. In addition to the members of the College, observers from the IAEA and the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons attended.

60. The Chairman reported on developments during the period under review.

61. The College commended the Chairman for his recent reports and briefings to the Security Council. The College also discussed a draft paper prepared by UNMOVIC outlining clusters of unresolved disarmament issues. The College welcomed the draft paper and commended it for its approach, in particular, its indication of actions Iraq could take to help to resolve particular issues, which could be successful only if Iraq provided immediate, unconditional and active cooperation. The draft paper would serve as an important source for the selection of the key remaining disarmament tasks called for in resolution 1284 (1999) and would be updated on a continuous basis as new information became available, including especially for the period 1998 to the present.

62. It was agreed that Commissioners be afforded time until 3 March for submitting any further comments they wished taken into account in the finalization of the paper.

63. It was decided to hold the next quarterly session on 28 and 29 May.

64. In accordance with paragraph 5 of resolution 1284 (1999), the Commissioners were consulted on the contents of the present report.

Observations

65. After three months of inspections, it may be legitimate to ask about results. First, has UNMOVIC come up to its full potential yet? Second, has Iraq cooperated, as required, and has disarmament been achieved?

66. The paragraphs above provide a description of the more important elements in UNMOVIC's work to establish and develop an effective inspection regime to verify that Iraq is free from, or being freed from, all weapons of mass destruction and other proscribed items — disarmament.

- UNMOVIC has, in most areas, more resources and more advanced tools at its disposal than did UNSCOM and, in several respects, UNMOVIC has developed a capacity that goes beyond what was contemplated in its initial planning, e.g., in the number of personnel, number of teams in the field, number of sites visited. Yet, it could certainly further expand and strengthen its activity, e.g., in some form of controls of vehicles. Member States could also provide further support and assistance, notably in the field of information.

- UNMOVIC is presently finalizing an internal document of some importance, namely, a list of the disarmament issues, which it considers currently unresolved, and of the measures which Iraq could take to resolve them, either by presenting proscribed stocks and items or by providing convincing evidence that such stocks or items no longer exist. The list, which in condensed form traces the history of clusters of weapons issues, has been prepared with a view to allowing UNMOVIC to perform its tasks under resolution 1284 (1999) to "address unresolved disarmament issues" and to identify "key remaining disarmament tasks". It could also serve as a yardstick against which Iraq's disarmament actions under resolution 1441 (2002) may be measured.

67. The paragraphs above further describe the actions taken by Iraq to respond to the obligations laid upon it in the relevant resolutions. Several of these are specific, as the obligation under resolution 1441 (2002) to provide a declaration 30 days after the adoption of the resolution. However, there is further the general obligation, prescribed in that resolution, to cooperate "immediately, unconditionally and actively" and the similar earlier requirement, in resolution 1284 (1999), for "cooperation in all respects". Has Iraq provided such cooperation and has it led to disarmament?

68. In comments on this question, a distinction has been made between cooperation on "process" and cooperation on "substance". UNMOVIC has reported that, in general, Iraq has been helpful on "process", meaning, first of all, that Iraq has from the outset satisfied the demand for prompt access to any site, whether or not it had been previously declared or inspected. There have thus been no sanctuaries in space. Nor have there been any sanctuaries in time, as inspections have taken place on holidays as on weekdays. While such cooperation should be a matter of course, it must be recalled that UNSCOM frequently met with a different Iraqi attitude.

69. Iraq has further been helpful in getting UNMOVIC established on the ground, in developing the necessary infrastructure for communications, transport and accommodation. Help has been given by the Iraqi side when needed for excavation and other operations. Iraqi staff has been provided, sometimes in excessive numbers, as escorts for the inspection teams. There have been minor frictions, e.g., demonstrations against inspectors and Iraqi criticism of some questions put by inspectors in the field.

70. A number of other actions might be discussed under the heading "cooperation on process":

(a) After some initial difficulties with Iraq relating to escorting flights into the no-fly zones, UNMOVIC helicopters have been able to operate as requested both for transport and inspection purposes;

(b) After some initial difficulties raised by Iraq, UNMOVIC has been able to send surveillance aircraft over the entire territory of Iraq in a manner similar to that of UNSCOM;

(c) The Iraqi commission established to search for and present any proscribed items is potentially a mechanism of importance. It should, indeed, do the job that inspectors should not have to do, namely, tracing any remaining stocks or pieces of proscribed items anywhere in Iraq. Although appointed around 20 January, it has so far reported only a few findings: four empty 122-mm chemical munitions and, recently, two BW aerial bombs and some associated components;

(d) The second Iraqi commission established to search for relevant documents could also be of importance, as lack of documentation or other evidence is the most common reason why quantities of items are deemed unaccounted for. Iraq has recently reported to UNMOVIC that the Commission had found documents concerning Iraq's unilateral destruction of proscribed items. As of the submission of this report, the documents are being examined;

(e) The list of names of personnel reported to have taken part in the unilateral destruction of biological and chemical weapons and missiles in 1991 will open the possibility for interviews, which, if credible, might shed light on the scope of the unilateral actions. Such interviews will soon be organized. Before this has occurred and an evaluation is made of the results, it is not possible to know whether they will prove to be a successful way to reduce uncertainty about the quantities unilaterally destroyed;

(f) Iraq has proposed a scientific technical procedure to measure quantities of proscribed liquid items disposed of in 1991. UNMOVIC experts are not very hopeful that these methods will bring meaningful results and will discuss this matter with Iraq in early March in Baghdad;

(g) It has not yet proved possible to obtain interviews with Iraqi scientists, managers or others believed to have knowledge relevant to the disarmament tasks in circumstances that give satisfactory credibility. The Iraqi side reports that it encourages interviewees to accept such interviews, but the reality is that, so far, no persons not nominated by the Iraqi side have been willing to be interviewed without a tape recorder running or an Iraqi witness present.

71. Cooperation on substance

(a) The declaration of 7 December, despite the hopes attached to it and despite its large volume, has not been found to provide new evidence or data that may help to resolve outstanding disarmament issues. As has been mentioned above, it did, however, usefully shed light on the developments in the missile sector and in the sector of non-proscribed biological activities in the period 1998-2002;

(b) The destruction of some items, e.g., small known quantities of mustard, is taking place under UNMOVIC supervision and further such action will take place, e.g., as regards the empty 122-mm chemical munitions;

(c) Iraq has identified two aerial R-400 bombs, as well as remnants of what it states to be 118 R-400 bombs, at Azzizziyah;

(d) The destruction of Al Samoud 2 missiles and related items declared by Iraq but found proscribed under the relevant resolutions has been requested and is due to commence on 1 March. Iraqi cooperation is essential;

(e) The presidential decree, which was issued on 14 February and which prohibits private Iraqi citizens and mixed companies from engaging in work relating to weapons of mass destruction, standing alone, is not adequate to meet the United Nations requirements. UNMOVIC has enquired whether a comprehensive regulation is being prepared in line with several years of discussions between Iraq and UNSCOM/UNMOVIC.

72. Under resolution 1284 (1999), Iraq is to provide "cooperation in all respects" to UNMOVIC and the IAEA. While the objective of the cooperation under this resolution, as under resolution 1441 (2002), is evidently the attainment, without delay, of verified disarmament, it is the cooperation that must be immediate, unconditional and active. Without the required cooperation, disarmament and its verification will be problematic. However, even with the requisite cooperation it will inevitably require some time.

73. During the period of time covered by the present report, Iraq could have made greater efforts to find any remaining proscribed items or provide credible evidence showing the absence of such items. The results in terms of disarmament have been very limited so far. The destruction of missiles, which is an important operation, has not yet begun. Iraq could have made full use of the declaration, which was submitted on 7 December. It is hard to understand why a number of the measures, which are now being taken, could not have been initiated earlier. If they had been taken earlier, they might have borne fruit by now. It is only by the middle of January and thereafter that Iraq has taken a number of steps, which have the potential of resulting either in the presentation for destruction of stocks or items that are proscribed or the presentation of relevant evidence solving long-standing unresolved disarmament issues.

Notes

[a] The Commission's 11 previous reports were issued as documents S/2000/516, S/2000/835, S/2000/1134, S/2001/177, S/2001/515, S/2001/833, S/2001/1126, S/2002/195, S/2002/606, S/2002/981 and S/2002/1303.

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Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, questions relating to refugees, returnees and displaced persons and humanitarian questions

Human rights questions: human rights questions, including alternative approaches for improving the effective enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms

Security Council
Fifty-eighth year

Letter dated 26 February 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a memorandum entitled "Facts relating to the anti-Armenian pogroms in Sumgait in February 1988" (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 104 and 109 (b), and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Movses **Abelian**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

03-26269 (E) 030303

Annex to the letter dated 26 February 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Facts relating to the anti-Armenian pogroms in Sumgait in February 1988

The 15th anniversary of the anti-Armenian pogroms in Sumgait (Azerbaijan) is the time for a full appraisal of the gravity of this tragic event for the Armenian people.

The events of Sumgait were a natural consequence of the atmosphere of total lawlessness, in which the Azerbaijani leaders spurred on the zealots in the country and incited them to further Sumgait-like atrocities. Whipped up into a state of nationalist hysteria, the deceived masses perpetrated vicious crimes, burning people alive, demonstrating how easily entire multitudes could be reft of any semblance of humanity and many hundreds of people transformed into bloodthirsty sadists. Yet, what is possibly still more monstrous than these barbarous acts is the way that the fine upstanding citizens entrusted with the reins of power in the republic and in the country did everything they could to conceal the truth about Sumgait and to shelter the culprits from justice. The impunity enjoyed by the instigators and organizers of the Sumgait pogrom is proof that the State itself took them under its wing. The way that events subsequently developed in Azerbaijan graphically demonstrated that the Sumgait approach to the settlement of ethnic scores was to be the chosen method. As early as May 1988, on the initiative of the Shusha district Party committee, the process of deporting Armenians from Shusha was commenced. In September, the bloody events took place in the village of Khojaly and the last Armenians were driven out of Shusha. In November, pogroms were being waged throughout Azerbaijan. Yet, there was no response — neither political nor legal — to any of these actions. An atmosphere of total impunity prevailed, in which there were repeated incitements to the perpetration of further Sumgait-like massacres. For its part, the Azerbaijani leadership only gave encouragement to those who showed the greatest zeal.

The Sumgait events were organized with a view to hushing up and concealing the Nagorny Karabakh problem. A wave of anti-Armenian demonstrations swept across all Azerbaijan in February 1988, but it was decided to deal the most decisive blow against the Armenians of Sumgait — as the most defenceless. Thugs were bussed into Sumgait from other regions and local officials drew up lists of all Armenians. Members of the country's top brass — the first secretary of the Central Committee and the chairman of the Council of Ministers of Azerbaijan — also made their way to Sumgait. Every possible preparation was made: even supplies of cobblestones were brought into the city. The only thing which the organizers of the Sumgait events had not reckoned with was that there might be honest and courageous people among the Azerbaijanis themselves who would refuse to succumb to the hysteria being whipped up. Had it not been for them, the city's entire Armenian population would have been mercilessly slaughtered. Sumgait was destined to transform the problem of Nagorny Karabakh and the will of its people — an essentially democratic issue — into one of the world's implacable ethnic conflicts.

Sumgait represented the focal point of the genocidal policies conducted by the Azerbaijani leaders against Armenians, one inevitable result of which was the "cleansing" of the Nakhichevan region and other historically Armenian territories of their Armenian populations.

In the course of three days in February 1988, virtually the entire territory of this city, with its population of a quarter of a million, became the arena for wide-scale, unrestrained pogroms against the Armenian population. Dozens were killed, a significant number of whom had been burned alive, after being beaten and tortured. Hundreds were wounded, many of them left disabled for life. Women and young girls were raped. More than 200 homes were wrecked and looted, scores of motor cars were set alight or smashed up, and dozens of workshops, shops, kiosks and other social facilities were smashed and plundered. Thousands of people became refugees.

And yet is this the only measure of the tragedy — how many people were killed in this city or how many homes were wrecked and looted? Immeasurable moral losses were suffered not only by the victims of the tragedy, but also by the people in whose name these atrocities were committed. "After the barbarities of Stalinism", wrote Moscow academics in their "Open letter to friends in Armenia", "no single event has occurred in our country that has dragged us further back from civilization to savagery". Sumgait turned two neighbouring peoples — Armenians and Azerbaijanis — into unconcealed and irreconcilable enemies and had exceptionally severe consequences for their subsequent relations with one another. Sumgait demonstrated for the first time that, in a multi-ethnic State which upheld friendship among peoples as one of its most hallowed principles, people could be killed quite simply because they belonged to the wrong nationality.

The first Sumgait "rally" was not particularly well supported but the second, organized the following day, 27 February, was attended by thousands of people, many of whom had been sent out on to the city square on the orders of their managers and supervisors. Among the rallying calls, uttered not only by the instigators, but also by such prominent citizens of Sumgait as the headmaster of secondary school No. 25 and a well-known actress from the Arablinksy Theatre, were references to Armenian "atrocities" and the "martyrs" of Kafan, the Karabakh issue, and the need to punish the Armenians, to kill them and to drive them from Sumgait and from Azerbaijan in general. The constant refrain of many harangues and the most often repeated slogan of those days was "Death to Armenians!". Besides words, other means of agitation were also used, such as vodka and drugs, dispensed directly from lorries to members of the crowd in great quantities and free of charge.

In the evening of 27 February, the "rallies" had degenerated into wide-scale violence. The first beatings and pogroms continued late into the night and then, the following day, hundreds of people who had been directly involved in the perpetration of these crimes assembled for their next "rally", just as if nothing untoward had happened. This is an extremely important point: the participants in the pogrom were thereby given definitive assurances of their impunity. The culmination of the "rally" on 28 February was reached when Muslim-zade, first secretary of the Sumgait city Party committee, took up the State flag of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic and led the huge crowd which had gathered behind him on to

Lenin Square. Thereupon, the crowd scattered and, already equipped with weapons, launched their attacks against the homes of Armenians.

The bloody tragedy which unfolded in Sumgait encompassed every imaginable human crime and suffering. We cannot but be astounded by the scale and impunity of the pogrom and the cynicism and brutality with which it was conducted. The crimes of those days seem quite inconceivable when we consider that the gangs perpetrating them were made up not of professional murderers and sadists, but of ordinary citizens, predominantly young people. For an explanation, we must look back in history and consider certain ideological and psychological realities. The massacre of Armenians in the city of Baku in 1918, the massacre in Shusha in 1920, the methodical expulsion, which ultimately achieved a 100 per cent success rate, of the indigenous Armenians from the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, countless crimes of an ethnic nature, the constant, virtually undisguised discrimination against the Armenian population throughout the Republic of Azerbaijan, the defiling of monuments to Armenian history and architecture, the hatred of Armenians instilled in children from their earliest years — all this must be taken into consideration if we are to understand how a student from a technical college or a factory worker who, prior to this, never did anything particularly reprehensible, entirely normal people with their own interests, family-oriented people, should suddenly prove capable of responding on the spur of the moment to incitations to kill their fellow citizens entirely innocent of any crime, to commit murders, and to perpetrate these acts with a pathological brutality that appalled even the forensic experts. And yet, however monstrous their offences, it is not they who are the prime culprits but those who were able so subtly and adroitly to transform them into monsters.

Since no condemnation was expressed and no punishment handed down for the crimes committed at Sumgait, they were followed by dozens of lesser and greater pogroms of the Armenian population of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic, including in the capital city, Baku, where more Armenian blood was spilled.

And with the passing of time, even in Sumgait, where no Armenians remained, persecutions were mounted against those who had saved Armenians during the days of that February hell, while at rallies in Baku the butchers of Sumgait were hailed as nothing less than national heroes.

The consequences of connivance are plain for all to see. "Sumgait became a spur for new tragedies and bloodshed", wrote the academics in their "Open letter to friends in Armenia". "While the blood of Sumgait might be on the hands of those who organized and carried out this bacchanal, responsibility for what followed rests with all those who failed to respond to the scale of the tragedy, who failed to understand and to this day fail to understand that no one, be he or she Lithuanian or Jew, Bashkir or Russian, that no people and no single person can feel safe while the crimes of murderers are allowed to go unpunished".

The organizers and the perpetrators of the Sumgait atrocities must be punished.

The peoples of the world must know the truth about the cruelty and barbarity of the Azerbaijani authorities and the criminals responsible for this monstrous crime.

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Security Council

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Identical letters dated 27 February 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

On instructions from my Government, I wish to transmit to you herewith the daily report on the activities carried out by the inspection teams of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Iraq on 26 February 2003.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Mohammed A. **Aldouri**
Permanent Representative

03-26315 (E) 060303 060303

Annex to the identical letters dated 27 February 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President of the Security Council

Activities of the UNMOVIC and IAEA inspection teams in Iraq

Inspection activities on Wednesday, 26 February 2003

I. IAEA inspection team

Group I

A group of three inspectors left the Canal Hotel at 8.40 a.m. Using vehicle-mounted equipment, the group made a radiation survey of Za`faraniyah, a suburb of Baghdad, in order to detect any proscribed radiological activity. The group completed its mission, which lasted four hours, and then returned to the hotel.

Group II

A second group, comprising three inspectors, left the Canal Hotel at 8.40 a.m. and went to project 404 of the Military Industrialization Corporation (MIC). The group interviewed the director of the project, asking him about the activities of the project and the number of employees and technical personnel. It then inspected all the workshops and buildings of the project. The group then went to the Ibn al-Baytar site which belongs to the Ministry of Industry and Minerals. The group inspected the workshops and buildings of the site, and asked about its activities. The group completed its mission, which lasted three hours, and then returned to the hotel.

II. UNMOVIC inspection team (missiles)

Group I

A group of two inspectors left the Canal Hotel at 8 a.m. and went to the Amin factory which belongs to the Rashid State Company, an affiliate of MIC. The group tagged several machines which had been overhauled and then went to the Nahrawan site which belongs to the Bassel State Company, an affiliate of MIC, where the group tagged the drying machine. The group concluded its mission, which lasted three hours, and then returned to the hotel.

Group II

A group of four inspectors left the Canal Hotel at 9.50 a.m. and went to the Shihah Trading Company, a private sector company. The group interviewed the director of the company, asking him about the items it supplied to the companies affiliated to MIC, and reviewed the contracts concluded between the company and MIC and the records and documents relating to the company. The group concluded its mission, which lasted two hours, and then returned to the hotel.

III. UNMOVIC inspection team (chemical)

Group I

A group of twelve inspectors left the Canal Hotel at 8 a.m. and went to the defunct Muthanna site which belongs to MIC. The group finished the destruction of munitions at the site, completed its mission, which lasted five and a quarter hours, and then returned to the hotel.

Group II

A group of seven inspectors left the Canal Hotel at 8.50 a.m. and went to the Asil Sulphonic Acid Production Plant which is in the private sector. The group inspected all the facilities and found out what the plant, which was not currently operating, contained. The group completed its mission, which lasted two hours and forty minutes, and then returned to the hotel.

IV. UNMOVIC inspection team (biological)

Group I

A group of six inspectors left the Canal Hotel at 7.30 a.m. and went to the bomb destruction site in the Aziziyah area. The group counted the bombs that had been recovered and tagged and numbered them. The leader of the group also asked for all the bomb fragments to be collected for weighing. The group completed its mission, which lasted six hours, and then returned to the hotel.

Group II (Mosul)

A group of four inspectors left the Nineveh Palace Hotel at 12.30 p.m. and went to the Consultative Clinic for Chest and Respiratory Diseases which belongs to the Ministry of Health. The group interviewed the director of the clinic, asking him about the date when the clinic started work, the most important tests that were being made there, the number of cases of illness and the relations between the clinic and other clinics. The group then inspected all the facilities of the clinic, concluded its mission, which lasted an hour, and then returned to the hotel.

V. UNMOVIC joint inspection team (Mosul)

A team of eight inspectors left the Nineveh Palace Hotel at 9 a.m. and went to the Northern Public Cement Company (the Badush Cement Works) which belongs to the Ministry of Industry and Minerals. The group interviewed the director of the works, asking him about its most important activities, the number of employees, the production lines and the funding agency. The team inspected the facilities of the works and looked at the records concerning the import of material. It concluded its mission, which lasted two and a half hours, and then returned to the hotel.

VI. Medium-altitude Mirage reconnaissance aircraft

The reconnaissance aircraft entered Iraqi airspace at 10.30 a.m. and left at 12 noon. It then returned to Iraqi airspace at 12.20 p.m. and left at 1.10 p.m. The aircraft made a reconnaissance of a number of areas of Iraq. The reconnaissance lasted two hours and twenty minutes.

VII. Interviews

IAEA asked to have a private interview with two Iraqi specialists in a Baghdad hotel. The National Monitoring Directorate notified them of the place and time for each of them and encouraged them to give the interview. The two interviews took place, one of them lasting two hours and twenty minutes, and the other an hour and a quarter.